Liliputian Sates in Digital Affairs and Cyber
Security
Liina Areng
Executive Summary
Small but Smart: Balancing the Costs and
Benefits of Smallness
An information society brings significant savings for
public administration and the delivery of public goods. For small states,
automation not only reduces costs, but also enhances the efficiency of public
services, which can be made equally accessible to citizens both
in central as well as remote, scarcely populated locations of the country.
Compared to larger states, small states tend to be more rational when it comes
to external affairs. The lack of strategic bargaining power vis-à-vis larger
states usually makes them avoid open confrontation and encourages compromise.
That should make small states better partners in diplomacy, particularly in
conflict resolution, where they are generally perceived as selfless, altruistic
mediators. Indeed, as they are generally less visible in international
disputes, they are perceived to have fewer “hidden agendas”. Advocacy for
internet freedom and cyber security, for example, is an ideal, politically
un-loaded topic that allows small countries to attract supporters and followers
and to build digital power. Small states need to be smart in order to maximize
their influence, and “smartness” can be achieved through innovation.8 Several
historically low-tech small states, such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria
and Ireland have managed to gain leading positions in new industries like
nanotechnology, biotechnology, telecommunications and cyber security. This has
not been mere coincidence, but a systemic and comprehensive national innovation
strategy encompassing important elements such as investment in human capital,
research and development, and well-functioning institutions.
These examples suggest that a country’s digital power base depends on
whether the government has prioritised the development of a focused and
comprehensive ICT strategy, an organisational structure and a national
competence base, including investment in education and research and
development. The limitations stemming from being small can even be
advantageous. Resource limitations, for instance, narrow the number of issues
which small states are able to prioritise, and promote quick consolidation of
gains in the short-term, while the attention of bigger states is scattered
across different topics and between shorter and longer term goals.9 Although small states might have fewer
resources to invest in cutting-edge research and development, they can still
achieve remarkable success through clever and consistent prioritisation of
resources in ICT and technological innovation.
The digital age brings several new opportunities for
small states to increase their international “weight”. The ICT revolution has
also been called the “death of distance”,10 making
every actor in cyberspace – small or large – theoretically possess a global
reach, broadening the scope of friends and foes11 and
offering new avenues of influence. ICT makes it possible for small and
peripheral states to improve connectivity with the rest of the world and widen
the channels to disperse and absorb information. This affects commerce,
people-to-people communication, and distance learning, but also broadens small
states’ means of projecting political, social and economic activity and power. The possibility of using different and
unpredictable strategic combinations of cyber tools affecting military,
political, economic and social targets makes the opponents in asymmetric
warfare more equal. The asymmetry is also created by the imbalance of attack
space – larger, technologically dependent nations possess a larger network
space with a greater number of weak spots vulnerable to attacks, while the
smaller nation has a smaller network surface to protect. “Mass” is no longer a
decisive factor in the military strategic and operational equations. Even a
lone cyber warrior can wreak havoc in an opponent’s networks, making
information technology a powerful tool for a small but sophisticated actor that
possesses sufficient skill and cunning.
Estodian Case Study: Digital Innovation
Estonia is
a small state by all of the three core criteria defined by Geser:12 substantial “objective” figures
(territory, population), relational characteristics (comparison to other
countries) and perceived “subjective” smallness (self-perception and external
perception). While territory and population are not very dynamic features
(although as explained Naturally, Estonia joined NATO and the EU (including the
Eurozone), and embraces a strong transatlantic relationship. Although sometimes
perceived as shy and quiet (national characteristics), Estonia has been a
picture-perfect kid on the block; “the only country in Europe that meets the
rules of every club to which it belongs [...] the eurozone’s targets on debt,
inflation and government deficit, as well as NATO’s standard: 2 per cent of GDP
on defence.”15 Having fulfilled its organisational
commitments, Estonia holds a positional advantage for effective engagement in
international affairs. Perhaps it is the national introversion or other
historical and cultural reasons that explain why Estonia is not fully using its
solid standing in international organisations to build up a powerful foreign
policy, but there is one niche where Estonia’s activities are truly visible and
are followed with keen interest, where being a small state has not hindered it
in confidently pursuing an opinion-leader’s role: cyber security and digital
development. Estonia has captured attention as a country which has quickly
responded to such challenges in the modern information society as the use of
technological innovation and shift to e-services. Estonia has been effective in
developing and promoting digital services both locally and abroad, making
digital development a successful case of “soft power” projection.
Conclusion
A state’s “smallness” is contextual and relational; it is rather a
perception of a state, and therefore not a static feature in space and time.
With smart choices, a small state can out-compete nations which are
geographically, demographically, economically or militarily much larger.
There are
several ways in which the “Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver.”20 It starts
with focusing on issues in which they have a comparative advantage, some
specific niche. Estonia has found that niche in developing innovative Digital
power gives a clear asymmetric advantage in national security to small states.
Although traditional major powers invest heavily in the development of ICT and
cyber warfare capability, small states still have more opportunity to compete
in this domain than in traditional warfare because, in modern warfare, “mass”
is no longer a decisive factor. Even though cyberspace cannot entirely replace
physical space in inter-state conflict, the diverse and unpredictable
combinations of ICT methods in asymmetric warfare dilute the traditional power
and dominance logic. Efficient, autonomous and well-trained cyber defence
forces within a limited, well-protected cyber attack space can secure victory
by using innovative techniques to breach the less defensible network breadth of
large state cyber defence or cyber warfare organisation. The “large and
powerful” cannot take for granted that they will always come out as winners
from cyber conflicts with a small state, particularly if small states have
jointly (or in combination with larger states) developed a seamlessly
functioning cooperation network that builds upon a pool of individual states’
expertise and capabilities routinely tested in regional exercises. Given the
level of economic integration and cross-border dependencies of critical
infrastructures, a Nordic- Baltic “cyber shield” might emerge in the
not-so-distant future.
A small state’s ability to project a combination of
“soft power”, to win friends and increase its visibility and influence, and
“hard power”, to enforce deterrence, needs intellect, courage, creativity and
forward-mindedness. The digital revolution creates a number of new
opportunities for small states, and small states are likely to play an ever more decisive role in
international security.
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